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ORGANIZING CORRUPTION CONTROLS AFTER A SCANDAL: 
REGAINING LEGITIMACY IN COMPLEX AND CHANGING INSTITUTIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTS 
Abstract 
We study the corruption control strategies at three Multinational Companies (MNC) before, 
during, and after the disclosure of corruption scandals and the initiation of legal procedures. 
In particular, we want to explore why some MNCs after a corruption scandal exceed regula-
tory expectations, choose proactive strategies, and influence their environment as institutional 
entrepreneurs that define best practices and new industry standards. Other companies, by con-
trast, act in a more incremental and self-referred way. We build on the concept of legitimacy 
in institutional theory, distinguish four strategies to regain legitimacy: decoupling, isomorphic 
adaptation, moral reasoning, and substantial influence, and explain the choice and sequence of 
these strategies. While all three case firms managed to (eventually) adapt to the compliance 
requirements imposed by external regulatory authorities, we found that only very distinct con-
stellations of scandal and reintegration process characteristics, such as the presence of a 
strong legitimacy shock and the necessity to react both radically and instantly, forces the 
company into the role of an institutional entrepreneur. In cases where such legitimacy shocks 
are lacking, companies have more time to react and hence rather choose to gradually adapt 
their organizational processes to regulatory expectations. Rather than acting as institutional 
entrepreneurs, these companies rely almost exclusively on participating in moral reasoning 
activities to safeguard their new anti-corruption strategy. However, if change processes occur 
rather reluctantly after the disclosure of a big scandal, we found that externally imposed 
monitors may exercise severe pressure forcing the transgressor to eventually install a leading 
set of corruption controls. 
Keywords  
Corruption scandal, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Regaining Legitimacy, Institutional En-
trepreneur 
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INTRODUCTION 
Organizational corruption is a phenomenon that has existed since the earliest business transac-
tions (Ashforth, Robinson and Treviño, 2008). Similarly, research on organizational corrup-
tion has been conducted for a long time; for example, the antecedents of this phenomenon 
have been analyzed for at least half a century (Ashforth and Anand, 2003; Finney and 
Lesieur, 1982; Simpson, 2002; Staw and Szwajkowski, 1975; Sutherland, 1949). These schol-
ars focused on processes of normalizing corruption in organizations (Ashforth and Anand, 
2003) or competitive pressures in certain industries (see also Coleman, 1987; Pinto, Leana 
and Pil, 2008) as two significant drivers of organizational corruption. Similarly, alternatives 
to control corrupt behavior have received attention in the literature (e.g. Klitgaard, 1988; 
Lange, 2008). The process of globalization intensifies the cross border exchange and relation-
ships and leads to an increase in the dynamic and complexity of international business and 
intensity of competition (Scherer and Palazzo, 2008). In the past decades scholars realized the 
impact of the globalization process on the scope and relevance of corruption in global busi-
ness (Barkemeyer and Preuss, 2012; Baucus, 1994; Pfarrer et al., 2008; Sanyal, 2005; 
Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). As a response to these challenges various national and international 
initiatives for fighting corruption have been launched: US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
1977, foundation of Transparency International 1993, OECD Anti Bribery Convention 1999, 
inclusion of anti corruption principle in UN Global Compact 2004, UK Bribery Act in 2010 
(for an overview, see e.g. Gebhardt and Müller-Seitz, 2011). 
Despite rising expectations in the international institutional environment to fight corruption, 
we do not know much about how corporations operating internationally respond to such in-
creasing and heterogeneous institutional demands. For a number of years, multinational cor-
porations (MNCs) have formulated anti-corruption policies and have expressed commitment 
to impede and detect corrupt practices for example through participation in international anti-
corruption initiatives that have emerged over the last decades. However, as recent scandals 
have shown (e.g. Siemens, ABB, Alstom, Daimler), corruption is still an endemic phenome-
non. The 2006 to 2008 Siemens scandal, for example, showed that organization-wide corrup-
tion can still exist, even though the institutional environment has significantly changed over 
the last decades giving the fight against corruption higher priority (Gebhardt and Müller-
Seitz, 2011; GibsonDunn, 2013; OECD, 2012a). Before the actual scandal, Siemens had es-
tablished relevant anti-corruption policies and was a member of Transparency International 
(TI) and the UN Global Compact. Only after the scandal, however, it became evident that the 
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company policies had not been sufficiently institutionalized within organizational structures 
and processes, e.g. through awareness building, the alignment of incentive structures, and the 
establishment of enforcement and control mechanisms. 
Pfarrer et al. (2008) provide valuable insights on how corrupt organizations can reintegrate 
after the disclosure of a corruption scandal. The authors conceptualize four stages that, if 
passed through successfully, may increase the speed and likelihood of reintegration. In accor-
dance with Pfarrer et al. (2008), we define ‘reintegration’ after facing a corruption scandal as 
a process of regaining legitimacy among multiple stakeholders – or: with the institutional en-
vironment (see also e.g. Sethi, 1979; Shapiro, 1991). While their model may be applicable not 
only to corrupt behavior, but also to unethical behavior or crises in general, it may neglect the 
particular context and challenges companies are facing when being involved in a transnational 
corruption scandal: regaining legitimacy in a changing and heterogeneous institutional envi-
ronment due to different legal and cultural expectations and uneven levels of enforcement 
mechanisms in the home and host countries of multinational companies. In particular, Pfarrer 
et al. model reintegration as a uniform ‘outcome’ that is sooner or later – if at all – achieved, 
assuming that there is a ‘group of legitimate organizations’ (2008, p. 735) the transgressors 
can reintegrate with. While such a group may exist in a rather static and homogeneous envi-
ronment, we argue that legitimate corporate anti-corruption practices in the dynamic and het-
erogeneous institutional environment are not always fully established but rather evolve as a 
result of interactions between corporations and their environment. 
Hence, MNCs may choose between different forms of legitimation strategies ranging from 
rather passive attempts of adapting to existing anti-corruption practices to proactive attempts 
of influencing the anti-corruption institutional environment, e.g. through the development of 
new best practices and initiatives. Actors that “contribute to changing institutions despite 
pressures towards stasis” are generally referred to as ‘institutional entrepreneurs’ (see e.g. 
Battilana, Leca and Boxenbaum, 2009, p. 66). We know from previous literature that shocks 
and crises often constitute “a first form of field-level conditions that invite the introduction of 
new ideas” (Battilana et al., 2009, p. 74; see also: Child, Lu and Tsai, 2007; Clemens and 
Cook, 1999; Fligstein, 1997; Fligstein, 2001; Greenwood, Hinings and Suddaby, 2002; Holm, 
1995). However, most of these studies analyzed crises on the level of a field such as social 
upheaval, competitive discontinuity or regulatory changes that did not have a direct relation to 
the issue of corruption. Organizational crises like systemic corporate corruption scandals so 
far received only limited attention despite the widespread corporate involvement in corrupt 
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practices and the apparent need to understand the interactions between corporations and their 
(anti-) corruption environment to eventually fight this century old phenomenon.  
We thus have so far little knowledge about how companies can reintegrate with and exert in-
fluence on the dynamic and heterogeneous anti-corruption institutional environment after fac-
ing a corruption scandal. We therefore want to explore the following research questions: 
1. How do corruption scandals trigger certain organizational change processes and 
thereby influence the legitimation strategies of MNCs in a dynamic environment? 
2. Why do certain MNCs act like anti-corruption institutional entrepreneurs upon reinte-
gration by predominantly choosing very proactive legitimation strategies? 
This paper aims to contribute to the literature on organizational corruption, legitimacy and 
institutional entrepreneurship by testing and extending organizational reintegration and cor-
ruption control models (see e.g. Lange, 2008; Pfarrer et al., 2008) through a dynamic case 
study of three purposefully selected firms. To distinguish between different strategies to re-
gain legitimacy, we build on and further develop typologies established by previous scholars 
(Oliver, 1991; Scherer, Palazzo and Seidl, 2013; Suchman, 1995). We thereby aim to generate 
valuable insights for scholars and practitioners not only on the evolution of leading anti-
corruption practices but also on the circumstances under which companies may chose to 
rather (ceremonially) adapt to existing practices as opposed to substantially and proactively 
shape new anti-corruption practices. 
The empirical study by Gebhardt and Müller-Seitz on a disclosed corruption scandal and the 
proactive corporate strategy to regain legitimacy focuses on only one case – Siemens – and 
was not able at that time to analyze the effectiveness and success of Siemens’ attempt to act 
as an institutional entrepreneur (Gebhardt and Müller-Seitz, 2011). More importantly, how-
ever, by restricting the study to one single company, the authors cannot disentangle how dif-
ferent initial characteristics of a scandal moderate the choice of legitimation strategy, and 
which factors play an important role during the reintegration process. Yet this is what promi-
nent scholars identified as a need for future research suggesting to test conceptual reintegra-
tion models by “incorporating longitudinal case study designs, whereby a researcher identifies 
a set of transgressors, perhaps with the same or related types of transgressions, and then stud-
ies each organization’s actions and press coverage over time to examine reintegration” 
(Pfarrer et al., 2008, p. 745). 
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Our set of transgressors consists of three MNCs from Germany and Switzerland – ABB Ltd., 
Daimler AG, Siemens AG – engaging in corrupt transnational business practices between 
around 1998 and 2007, as disclosed mainly in the period 2006 to 2010. While all three case 
firms managed to adapt to the compliance requirements imposed by external regulatory 
authorities, we found that only very distinct constellations of scandal and reintegration char-
acteristics may trigger the choice to act as an anti-corruption institutional entrepreneur. 
First, the case of Siemens revealed that the presence of both strong legal/regulatory sanction-
ing and social sanctioning triggered by a strong legitimacy shock forced the company to in-
stantly and radically develop and implement a variety of internal corruption controls but also 
to act externally as an institutional entrepreneur trying to promote its own new practices as 
new standards in the field. Second, the case of Daimler revealed significant latitude in devel-
oping a response strategy because Daimler was facing (a) a scandal after the disclosure of a 
much bigger case at another company (Siemens) and (b) mainly legal/regulatory punishments 
yet less societal sanctioning. As a consequence Daimler took a more gradual strategy to rein-
tegrate and was able to learn from leading practices recently implemented for example by 
Siemens. However, the lack of sufficient social sanctioning made additional external regula-
tory pressure necessary to finally achieve a comprehensive compliance program that today in 
many aspects comes close to the one at Siemens. Third, the case of ABB revealed some sur-
prising or even counterintuitive findings. Having faced a series of two legal procedures with 
US authorities, the first of which dates back to 2004, the company displays leading practices 
years before Siemens and Daimler. However, despite the fact that these regulatory sanctions 
clearly surpassed the level of societal sanctioning and media attention, ABB clearly focused 
on socially/culturally oriented controls rather than administrative ones. 
INSTITUTIONAL THEORY PERSPECTIVES ON CORRUPTION SCANDALS, 
CORRUPTION CONTROLS AND LEGITIMATION STRATEGIES 
Organizational corruption and changes in the institutional environment 
Corruption can be generally defined as the ”misuse of an organizational position or authority 
for personal gain or organizational (or sub-unit) gain, where misuse in turn refers to depar-
tures from accepted social norms” (Anand, Ashforth and Joshi, 2004, p. 40). However, apply-
ing an institutional theory perspective to study corruption and defining institutions as “regula-
tive, normative, and cognitive structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to 
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social behavior” (Scott, 1995, p. 33), we do not want to limit our study on corruption on the 
departure from accepted social norms. While for example the payment of larger amounts of 
money to government officials in order to secure a business contract may be in line with the 
social norms in high corruption risk countries, these transactions are nonetheless illegal in 
every part of the world (see e.g. Nichols, 1999). Therefore, we include departures from regu-
latory and cognitive or socio-cultural dimensions into our definition of corruption, which is in 
line with previous scholars studying corruption from an institutional theory perspective 
(Gebhardt and Müller-Seitz, 2011; Misangyi, Weaver and Elms, 2008).  
Moreover, we focus our analysis on systemic corruption at the level of the organization, an 
approach that has been identified by previous scholars as the “bad barrel” view (see Ashforth 
et al., 2008, p. 673). Finally, our analysis is restricted on those cases of corruption that are 
transnational in scope and involve a foreign public official as at least one party of the corrupt 
activity.  
While national legislation to fight corruption has long existed, initiatives and legislation con-
demning transnational corruption have – with single exceptions – not followed until recently. 
If legislation on foreign bribery already existed, it was mostly not enforced. The Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act (FCPA) may constitute the most prominent example in this regard: with 
this act, passed by the US Congress in 1977 and amended in 1988, legislation on corporate 
corruption entered a new level: For the first time, corporate corruption of foreign officials is 
legally prohibited and sanctioned. This law covers all American companies as well as foreign 
companies with securities traded on exchanges in the US. Although in existence for more than 
three decades, only in the last few years, prosecutions under the act enforced by the US Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Department of Justice (DOJ) significantly in-
creased (GibsonDunn, 2013). There are currently at least 78 corporations under investigation 
for possible FCPA violations, and a total of USD 3.74 billion has been paid by 58 companies 
to settle such corruption charges (Wayne, 2012). Many other countries have enacted laws 
similar to this Act. Nichols (2012, p. 362) provides a list of more then 50 countries criminaliz-
ing transnational bribery, and expects more countries to join this list. After its failure to sanc-
tion bribery of the British defense company BAE, the United Kingdom enacted its ambitious 
UK Bribery Act of 2010, which even goes beyond the FCPA – e.g. by imposing strict liability 
for failure to prevent bribes – but so far lacks sufficient evidence of enforcement as compared 
to the FCPA. 
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Beside these changes in the regulatory environment, we can perceive changes in the norma-
tive and cultural-cognitive environment regarding the fight against corruption. Various inter-
national organizations like the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) and the United Nations (UN) established international conventions (e.g. the OECD 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions, or the UN Convention against Corruption) that criminalize transnational corrup-
tion. Similarly multi-stakeholder initiatives (e.g. the UN Global Compact or the World Eco-
nomic Forum’s Partnering Against Corruption Initiative) and non-governmental organizations 
like Transparency International provide guidance in the fight against corruption (for good 
overviews of changes in the institutional environment to fight corruption, see: Gebhardt and 
Müller-Seitz, 2011; Hess, 2012). 
While not only the expectations in the institutional environment to fight corruption are rising, 
but also the actual number of companies that face prosecutions under increasingly enforced 
anti-corruption acts like the FCPA (see GibsonDunn, 2013), we can conclude that several 
MNCs have missed or underestimated these developments in their environment and are hence 
increasingly confronted with a publicly disclosed corruption scandal. In the following, we will 
outline how certain kinds of corporate corruption scandals may result in a legitimacy shock 
and how different types of post-scandal legitimation strategies can be expected depending on 
the size and kind of this legitimacy shock. 
The role of a corruption scandal in triggering different legitimation strategies 
Organizational legitimacy can be understood as the social acceptance of actions or institu-
tions, it is a vital yet intangible resource of any organization (e.g. Berger and Luckmann, 
1966; Suchman, 1995). From a neo-institutional point of view, organizational survival is de-
termined by the extent of alignment with the institutional environment; hence, MNCs try to 
portrait themselves as legitimate organizations through the incorporation of institutional ele-
ments, both from in- and outside the organization (Kostova, Roth and Dacin, 2008). Corrup-
tive practices, however, pose a perpetual threat to the legitimacy of MNCs. Corruption is wide 
spread in global business (TI, 2012).  
As a consequence corporations can easily become involved in corrupt practices for example 
along their supply chains, both within and outside their sphere of influence. Such an involve-
ment conflicts with institutional demands so that corporations with corruption allegations suf-
fer from a loss of legitimacy and societal support. In particular, MNCs trying to regain legiti-
macy, i.e. to reintegrate, may face the challenge of regaining regulatory legitimacy by align-
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ing their global compliance programs with the unequivocal law forbidding corruption existing 
in every country around the world (see Nichols, 1999), and/or regaining social and cultural-
cognitive legitimacy by adapting their business practices to the underlying and often diverg-
ing regional informal business practices. 
The paradox of having to accommodate several conflicting legitimacy strategies at the same 
time has been intensively discussed in the paradox literature (see e.g. Lewis, 2000; Scherer et 
al., 2013; Schreyögg and Steinmann, 1987; Smith and Lewis, 2011). Related literature in the 
institutional theory field refers to such a paradox as “the tension between institutional deter-
minism and agency” (Battilana et al., 2009, p. 67), or the “paradox of embedded agency” 
(Holm, 1995; Seo and Creed, 2002). The isomorphism literature assumes a rather passive role 
of an organization leading to the convergence of legitimacy strategies in an institutional field 
(e.g. DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 2007; Strang and Meyer, 1993; Sutton and Dobbin, 
1996; Zucker, 1983) whereas the literature on actor-level heterogeneity denies the rise of an 
enduring convergent institution or legitimacy strategy (Hardy and Maguire, 2008; Maguire 
and Hardy, 2006; Maguire, Hardy and Lawrence, 2004; Zilber, 2002). 
Recognizing the possibility of such a paradox for an MNC to simultaneously accommodate 
different (anti-)corruption legitimation strategies, we argue that certain kinds of corruption 
scandals – i.e. legitimacy shocks – may solve this paradox by forcing the transgressor into the 
application of only a restricted set of legitimation strategies. 
Institutional theory informs us that, when a mismatch between an organization’s status quo of 
operation and social expectations occurs, the organization needs to (re)-adapt to the percep-
tions of their constituencies. To do so, literature suggests that organizations may use three 
different forms of legitimation strategies: isomorphic adaption, moral reasoning and/or stra-
tegic manipulation (Driscoll, 2006; Oliver, 1991; Scherer et al., 2013; Scott, 2007; Suchman, 
1995). By using an isomorphic adaption strategy, the organization adapts its organizational 
practices to social expectations, e.g. an MNC may choose to increasingly report on corruption 
in its annual reports if it perceives that this is an emerging practice in its industry or country 
etc. 
By using a moral reasoning strategy (Palazzo and Scherer, 2006; Scherer et al., 2013), orga-
nizations may also enter a discursive argumentation process with social groups, trying to cre-
ate a solution based on a common position with anyone involved. An example for such a 
strategy would be to join multi-stakeholder initiatives like the UN Global Compact to discuss 
ideas on how to fight corruption with peers at the initiative’s network meetings. Third, a com-
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pany may use a strategic manipulation strategy by influencing the perceptions of its constitu-
encies with regards to the benefits the organization appears to create for them. Manipulation 
refers to “the active attempt to alter the content of institutional requirements and to influence 
their promoters” (Pache and Santos, 2010, p. 463). While the attempt to manipulate the exter-
nal institutional environment may indeed entail active elements, the attempt to change internal 
organizational structures may often be far less active, if present at all. 
Hence, we suggest to distinguish between symbolic and substantial forms of strategic ma-
nipulation strategy: (1) according to Scherer et al. (2013), companies may use instruments of 
impression management and strategic public relations to engage in a symbolic form of strate-
gic manipulation, i.e. decoupling (Boxenbaum and Jonsson, 2008; Meyer and Rowan, 1977). 
Organizations decouple their actual organizational practices from the perception of their orga-
nizational structures and procedures. Here, organizations achieve legitimacy by constructing a 
façade of organizational structures and processes that reflects institutional myths (e.g., deter-
mined by expectations concerning proper business practices) and at the same time not adapt-
ing those in the organizational practices (Boxenbaum and Jonsson, 2008; Meyer and Rowan, 
1977). Such a strategy is most evident when companies demonstrate commitment in the fight 
against corruption by increasingly reporting on this issue and joining more and more initia-
tives like the UNGC or Transparency International, but at the same time fail to implement 
necessary anti-corruption organizational structures and hence sooner or later face a systemic 
corruption scandal.  
(2) In contrast, we define a substantial form of strategic manipulation strategy as the attempt 
of an organization to substantially influence the expectations of the institutional environment 
through confrontation with certain material organizational practices (here: substantively em-
bodied actions to fight corruption) (Misangyi et al., 2008). As ‘strategic influence’ strategy in 
the context of corruption, we would classify the behavior of a company that demonstrated not 
only (a) strong commitment against corruption, and (b) the implementation of organizational 
structures to prevent and detect the same (integrity training, alignment of incentive structures, 
whistle-blower protection, follow-ups after incidents of corruption), but also (c) proactively 
uses its influence (mainly uni-directionally) to ensure its standards serve as a benchmark that 
is spread across its institutional environment (e.g. organizational peers, investigators, regula-
tors, policy makers, NGOs). 
We therefore include the following four strategies in our theoretical framework of organizing 
corruption controls after a scandal: isomorphic adaption, moral reasoning, substantial influ-
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ence, and decoupling (i.e. symbolic strategic manipulation). Recalling our definition of an 
‘institutional entrepreneur’ as an actor initiating changes that contribute to the transformation 
of existing or the creation of new institutions (Battilana et al., 2009; DiMaggio, 1988), we 
associate this proactive role with companies that do not only limit themselves to exchange 
new ideas via a moral reasoning strategy but also try to substantially and strategically influ-
ence their environment by imposing others their own standards. 
Recognizing the high power especially of the FCPA enforcement agencies, i.e. the US SEC 
and DOJ, we argue in this paper that the disclosure and enforcement of systemic organiza-
tional corruption in many cases constitutes such a shock of legitimacy for the concerned 
transgressors that the only chance to regain legitimacy is to choose a strictly proactive role. 
We therefore expect that the bigger the scope of the disclosed scandal and the imposed regula-
tory burdens, the less successful more passive forms of legitimation strategies may become, 
and thus the more likely the paradox of simultaneously accompanying active and passive 
forms of legitimation strategies will dissolve. The rationale behind this argument is that such 
a scandal may have a direct and distinct influence on the two central factors explaining the 
choice of legitimation strategies as identified by previous scholars: the costs of organizational 
change and the consistency of societal expectations (see Scherer et al., 2013). If disclosed 
criminal corrupt practices have reached a certain size and involve a large-scale criminal inves-
tigation, this shock of regulatory legitimacy is likely to create public alertness and thus spill 
over to challenge social and cultural-cognitive legitimacy of the transgressor, especially if the 
MNC is originated in regions with strict anti-corrupt societal expectations (see e.g.: Gebhardt 
and Müller-Seitz, 2011; Schwarz, 2011). 
As summarized in our theoretical framework for legitimacy strategies in the context of a cor-
ruption scandal (Figure 1), we therefore propose that with a corruption scandal having passed 
a certain threshold, the continuation of rather passive legitimation strategies like decoupling 
or isomorphic adoption becomes less likely if not impossible. In contrast, we expect the final 
choice between the more active legitimation strategies – strategic influence and moral reason-
ing – to be determined by several contingencies such as the timing of the scandal or the power 
or resources of the transgressor (see e.g. Battilana et al., 2009; Gebhardt and Müller-Seitz, 
2011). Finally, we assume that a company choosing exclusively proactive legitimation strate-
gies substantial influence and moral reasoning, exercises the role of an institutional entrepre-
neur. The expected influence of such companies on the institutional environment is then illus-
trated with the arrow pointing back from the institutional entrepreneur to the (initial) institu-
tional expectations in Figure 1. 
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Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
Of course, beyond the mere type or scope of a corruption scandal, several other contingencies 
may determine the choice of legitimacy. Contingencies determining the responses to legiti-
macy issues (Christmann and Taylor, 2002; Oliver, 1991) and to complex and heterogeneous 
environments (Child and Rodrigues, 2011; Pache and Santos, 2010; Sirmon, Hitt and Ireland, 
2007) have been well discussed in the literature. In our context, we should note that for a 
company to follow a substantial influence strategy, a precondition may be that this company 
disposes over sufficient ‘power’ or ‘resources’ (see Child and Rodrigues, 2011; Scherer et al., 
2013). Similarly, Misangyi et al. (2008) argue that institutional change is most likely to be 
successful if the involved social actors are equipped with ‘sufficient resources’ (referring to 
DiMaggio, 1988, p. 14). In contrast, those corporations with less power/resources may not be 
able to impose their own practices on others but may still hope to somehow benefit from their 
compliance investments; they may hence rather choose to engage in mutual exchange with 
their environment through the moral reasoning strategy, and abstain from the strategic influ-
ence strategy. While a detailed integration of further contingencies such as power/resources in 
our theoretical model would go beyond the scope of this study, we allow for the exploration 
of such factors during our qualitative analysis. 
METHODS 
Research design and sampling 
We apply a multiple dynamic case design to compare and interpret our findings across target 
firms (Yin, 1984), as well as over time and space (Gerring, 2007), while at the same time ag-
gregating data where appropriate. In selecting our sample, we followed a theoretical sampling 
approach (see Strauss and Corbin, 1998) of choosing ‘extreme’ cases wherein the phenome-
non of interest - here:  the disclosed corruption scandal - is ‘transparently observable’. As 
regards time, we cover the three-year period from 2012 to 2014. We are hence able to inter-
view firm representatives against the end of their regulatory reintegration process (the period 
in which the transgressors operate under the “Deferred Prosecution Agreement” (DPA) im-
posed by the SEC or DOJ) and after the termination of these regulatory burdens. In addition, 
we include longitudinal data on corruption from 2006 to 2009 by Gebhardt and Müller-Seitz 
(2011) in our analysis. 
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From the universe of multinational companies, we selected only cases with recent scandals 
involving transnational bribery of foreign public officials yet with apparently varying charac-
teristics of the initial scandal and subsequent regulatory burdens. Our assumption was that the 
analysis of cases with both similar and diverging initial conditions and process variables may 
play a role in affecting the legitimation strategy outcome (see Doz, 1996; Pfarrer et al., 2008). 
As to what central characteristics of a scandal and reintegration process may constitute, litera-
ture suggests considering the prominence and timing of the transgression and transgressor 
(Pfarrer et al., 2008) beside the mere costs related to fines, bribes paid and organizational 
change investments (see e.g. Gebhardt and Müller-Seitz, 2011). Scholars then define the ac-
cess to resources as an essential element mediating the reintegration process (e.g. Battilana et 
al., 2009; Lawrence, 1999). 
With the intent to control for the institutional environment, access considerations led us to 
choose only MNCs with headquarters in Switzerland or Germany. Both countries are per-
ceived to have similarly low corruption risks (TI, 2012), have similarly strict anti-corruption 
legislation and are at the same at an advanced stage of anti-corruption implementation in the 
context of the OECD Convention Against Corruption (see OECD, 2012a). To hold the indus-
try context meaningfully constant yet allow for subtle variations at the same time, we chose to 
focus on two sectors with generally moderate to high risks of corruption: diversified industri-
als and automotive/manufacturing (TI, 2011, p. 15). 
Based on these considerations, the following companies are initially selected for our study: 
Siemens, ABB and Daimler. In particular, we compare the compliance related activities at 
Siemens with the ones of its industry competitor ABB. To gain insights on the impact of a 
firm’s market power/resources and/or industry competitive structure, we include a major 
player of the automobile industry, Daimler, hit by a scandal close to the magnitude of the one 
at Siemens. In order to fully adhere to Eisenhardt’s (1989, 537) recommendations of analyz-
ing between four to ten cases, we aim in a next step to include further companies in our analy-
sis. For example, we think about including one major competitor of each industry that has not 
faced a disclosed scandal such as the BMW AG of the automotive sector and Schneider Elec-
tric SA of the power & electronic sector. Another option would be to include further trans-
gressors such as the German automotive company MAN (part of VW group) or the French 
power and transport company Alstom. Due to feasibility concerns, the analysis of these firms 
will be restricted on the evaluation of documentary data and media coverage. 
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As we study a transnational phenomenon, we cannot reasonably limit our analysis to the in-
vestigation of the corporate headquarter perspective. In contrast, we want to include the per-
spective from subsidiaries in at least one country of geographic distance yet institutional prox-
imity. We therefore chose to conduct additional interviews with our case firms and third par-
ties in Australia. Australia displays similarly low levels of corruption risk compared to Swit-
zerland and Germany (see TI, 2012), and has also reached phase 3 of implementing the 
OECD anti-bribery convention (OECD, 2012b). Apart from broadening our interview base 
and obtaining a global perspective, this nested analysis of two establishments within each 
company allows us to distinguish between the centralized perspective of the headquarters and 
the local perspective of a geographically distant subsidiary, 
Measurement 
Organizational corruption controls. Literature from both organizational control and 
corruption control provides valuable insights on concepts and processes to control organiza-
tional corruption. Lange (2008) has recently merged these two streams of literature to concep-
tualize an ‘Organizational Corruption Control Circumplex’. Importantly for the purpose of 
this paper studying the interaction between corruption control strategies and the institutional 
environment, Lange (2008) includes the organizational environment in his model. He distin-
guishes between a social/cultural and an administrative/regulatory dimension of corruption 
control, which is a central aspect of legitimacy as discussed in institutional theory (see e.g. 
Scott, 2007). Apart from the environmental sanctioning controls, Lange lists six further con-
trol types, three under the social/cultural dimension and three under the administrative dimen-
sion. 
Lange calls for deeper exploration of how and why certain control types may be applied in 
combination (2008, p. 724). He expects that the control types within the social cultural di-
mension as well as the ones within the administrative dimension are compatible respectively. 
His model, however, treats organizational corruption controls in a rather static context, which 
may constitute critical limitations especially when studying the relationship between envi-
ronmental and intra-organizational corruption controls of his model. For the purpose of our 
study we put this model in a dynamic context by treating a disclosed corruption scandal as a 
form of environmental sanctioning and study the impact of such sanctioning on the applica-
tion and combination of the other control types. These intra-organizational control types are 
listed in the right column of Table 1. Building on Lange’s expectations regarding compatible 
types of control, we may expect that social sanctioning may trigger predominantly so-
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cial/cultural types of control whereas legal/regulatory sanctioning may trigger rather adminis-
trative types of control. 
Given that this work deals with corruption cases that all included settlements with the US 
SEC, we also considered the criteria for ‘Effective Compliance and Ethics Program[s]’ by the 
US Sentencing Commission (US_Sentencing_Commission, 2010, §8B2.1.). Finally, in order 
to sufficiently address corruption controls, going beyond such regulatory requirements, we 
further consider interactive and/or voluntary types of organizational processes as modeled in 
the ‘Corporate Citizenship Assessment Tool’ by (2013). Table 1 illustrates the synthesis of 
these three models, depicting the central corruption control dimensions and elements in the 
left and middle column and the respective references to the original models in the right col-
umn.  
----------------------------------!
Insert Table 1 about here 
----------------------------------!
To reduce biases wherever possible, we triangulate both our documentary as well as interview 
data (Eisenhardt, 1989; Flick, 1992). While all three transgressors are expected to have in-
stalled the compliance components as required by the SEC in the relative regulatory proceed-
ing documents, we use our interview data to assess the comprehensiveness of each compo-
nent, identify possible imbalances or additional components not explicitly required, and trace 
the dynamic process of implementing the components over time. 
Corruption scandal characteristics. Building again on the corruption control model 
by Lange (2008) and further considering previous research on corruption scandals (Gebhardt 
and Müller-Seitz, 2011; Pfarrer et al., 2008), we distinguish between two central scandal 
characteristics based on the type of sanctioning by the institutional environment.   
a) Regulatory sanctions – bribes, fines and costs involved 
b) Social sanctions – timing/prominence of transgression 
Regulatory sanctions in our study are mainly comprised of the disgorgement and penalty 
payments as listed in the settlement agreements between our case firms and the SEC. Further, 
yet to a less quantifiable extent, also other legal expenses e.g. for lawsuits, lawyers, consult-
ants etc. were considered. On the other hand, we identified the level of social sanctions 
mainly through the level of negative press coverage our transgressors received in the course 
of disclosure, settlement and reintegration. The timing of the transgression, e.g. as regards its 
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novelty in a certain industry, region etc. is thereby considered as a key factor to explain the 
level of scandal prominence or social sanctions (see Pfarrer et al., 2008). 
The grey oval “scandal characteristics*” in Figure 1 refers to these two characteristics as cen-
tral elements to describe the scope and type of a scandal. Of course, we were also open to 
include other characteristics or specify the existing ones during the course of our interview or 
documentary analysis as soon as new hints emerged. 
Data collection 
In 2012 and 2013, we conducted at least two rounds of interviews with representatives at each 
selected case firm headquarters either at intervals of 12 months or upon the notice of a special 
event at the target firms. Moreover, we were able to interview representatives of the company 
subsidiaries as well as third parties in Australia in the first half of 2013. Finally, our inter-
views with the representative at Siemens allowed us to obtain insights on the headquarter and 
subsidiary role at the same time given her double function as compliance officer for the Sie-
mens Division Building Technologies headquartered in Zug, Switzerland, and as regional 
compliance officer for the Siemens country subsidiary Switzerland. 
Key sources of archival data are (1) company sustainability reports, codes of conduct or press 
releases. These documents reflecting the company perspective will be compared with (2) 
documents reflecting the public perspective such as media coverage on corruption risks (pro-
vided by RepRisk AG) or other corruption perception information (provided by Transparency 
International). (3) The arguably most useful source of data for our purpose are criminal pro-
ceedings documents (complaint, deferred prosecution agreement, monitor reports) by the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Department of Justice (DOJ). As regards our 
interview data, triangulation of respondent perspectives is ensured: (1) We interview manag-
ers of the case firms, (2) we consider external advice of key informants like lawyers, judges 
and auditors; (3) last but not least, we discuss our findings with leading international corrup-
tion researchers. For a compilation of consulted data sources by type and frequency/volume, 
see Table 2: 
-------------------------------!
Insert Table 2 about here 
-------------------------------!
Having conducted two rounds of personal – in few cases telephone – interviews with compli-
ance representatives at the company headquarters and a separate round of interviews at their 
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Australian subsidiaries, each taking mostly between 45 and 90 minutes, we were able to cover 
the whole range of the organizational situation before, during and after the respective corrup-
tion scandals. To broaden our perspective, we conducted several telephone conversations and 
a personal interview with an experienced lawyer at Gibson & Dunn involved in the investiga-
tions at Siemens and Daimler, to ask him about the compliance investigations and progresses 
at these two companies. Moreover, we were able to talk to representatives of professional 
service firms like PWC and non-governmental organizations like TI. In addition, we con-
sulted academics like Christian Gebhardt, an experienced researcher on the Siemens corrup-
tion case, whose study (2011) serves as a starting point for central parts of our analysis.  
As to our documentary analysis, we consulted internal compliance related company docu-
ments, the database of RepRisk AG as well as criminal proceedings documents of the SEC. 
Furthermore, three bachelor and master students helped us with the initial analysis of com-
pany documents such as Annual Reports and Sustainability Reports.  
To minimize biases on the side of the interviewer, my co-author and I jointly conducted the 
interviews whenever possible. To make sense of the great variety of data, based on the respec-
tive company’s documents, press coverage and (if available) initial interviews, we developed 
and discussed an interview guideline before we met with our case firms whenever possible. 
Furthermore, directly after each interview, we reflected over the key themes and ‘take-aways’ 
and tried to put our new findings in the context of our existing analysis. 
Data Analysis 
Step 1: Classifying the corruption scandal and transgressor characteristics  
The SIEMENS AG and its systemic corruption scandal 
The Siemens AG (Siemens) is one of the worldwide leading technology companies operating 
in more than 190 countries and headquartered in Munich and Berlin. The company is struc-
tured in four business divisions, which are (listed in the order of decreasing turnover): energy, 
industry, infrastructure & cities, and healthcare (Siemens, 2013a). 
Siemens’ corruption scandal: 
a) Legal/regulatory sanctioning – bribes, fines and costs involved: The SEC alleges Sie-
mens to have paid “more than 1.4 billion USD in bribes to government officials in 
Asia, Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and the Americas” and asserts that the “pattern 
of bribery by Siemens was unprecedented in scale and geographic reach” (press 
release, SEC, 2008a). The fines imposed by US and German regulatory authorities 
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amount to more than 1.6 billion USD with the organizational costs for rehabilitation 
expected to surpass this number. The costs for organizational changes to address the 
regulatory requirements are probably even higher. Altogether, we can ascertain with 
confidence that the bribes, fines and costs involved in this Siemens corruption scandal 
have reached a very high, i.e. unprecedented, level. 
b) Social sanctioning – prominence/timing of transgression: According to the SEC’s 
complaint, “between March 12, 2001, and September 30, 2007, Siemens created 
elaborate payment schemes to conceal the nature of its corrupt payments, and the 
company’s inadequate internal controls allowed the conduct to flourish” (press 
release, SEC, 2008a). In December 2008, Siemens entered an agreement to settle its 
FCPA related charges including the installation of an external monitor for a period of 
four years until December 2012 (SEC, 2008b). As we learnt in the course of our inter-
views, even before the investigations by the SEC, Siemens faced a strong legitimacy 
shock in November 2006 when around 200 policemen and officials appeared in front 
of the Munich headquarters to confiscate all information relevant to investigating the 
corruption cases at Siemens. This action created instant awareness of the magnitude of 
the problem at almost every Siemens employee around the world and was accompa-
nied with an unprecedented level of media coverage as regards corporate corruption 
(see RepRisk_AG, 2013). With both unprecedented levels of regulatory and social 
attention, the prominence of the transgression can be assessed as very high. 
c) Prominence of transgressor: Having operations in more than 190 countries together 
employing around 370,000 employees and generating annual turnovers of generally 
more than 80 billion EUR (Siemens, 2013a), the prominence of the transgressor can 
be assessed as (very) high. 
The DAIMLER corruption scandal 
The DAIMLER AG (Daimler) is a multinational automotive corporation with headquarters in 
Stuttgart, Germany, and locations on every continent with focus on Europe, Asia and North 
America. The company is structured in five divisions, of which the two most important are 
Mercedes-Benz Cars and Daimler Trucks (Daimler, 2013). 
a) Legal/regulatory sanctioning – bribes, fines and costs involved: According to the SEC 
allegations „Daimler paid at least $56 million in improper payments over a period of 
more than 10 years. The payments involved more than 200 transactions in at least 22 
countries. Daimler earned $1.9 billion in revenue and at least $90 million in illegal 
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profits through these tainted sales transactions, which involved at least 6,300 commer-
cial vehicles and 500 passenger cars.“ (SEC, 2010b). The fines to settle these charges 
with the SEC and DOJ amounted together to around 185 million USD. Taking into ac-
count that an external monitor was appointed as an indication for major organizational 
compliance deficits, the organizational costs for rehabilitation are also expected to be 
substantial. However, recognizing the differences to the dimensions at Siemens, we 
assess the overall level of bribes, fines and cost as high. 
b) Social sanctioning – prominence/timing of transgression:  Considering that the corrupt 
practices were disclosed by the SEC in March 2010 with an agreed DPA lasting from 
March 2010 to March 2013, the timing of the scandal was at least one and a half years 
after the one at Siemens. Moreover, there was no specific shock creating instant and 
massive public awareness, which is also reflected in a significantly lower level of me-
dia coverage on corruption risks (RepRisk_AG, 2013). We therefore assess the level 
of prominence of the transgression as rather medium (or even low). 
c) Prominence/resources of transgressor: With annual turnovers over 100 billion EUR 
(Daimler, 2013) exceeding the levels at Siemens, yet with lower numbers of employ-
ees (around 275.000) and country locations, the prominence of the transgressor can 
also be assessed as (very) high. 
The ABB corruption scandal 
Die Asea Brown Bovery AG (ABB) is one of the worldwide leading firms in energy and 
automation technologies. The company has its headquarters in Zurich, Switzerland, and oper-
ates in more than 100 countries (ABB, 2013a).  
a) Legal/regulatory sanctioning – bribes, fines and costs involved: According to the SEC 
allegations, “ABB's subsidiaries made at least $2.7 million in illicit payments [...] to 
obtain contracts that generated more than $100 million in revenues for ABB“ (SEC, 
2010a). To settle these charges, ABB has agreed to pay more than 39.3 million USD. 
In the case of ABB, no external monitor was appointed, which together with the re-
quirements listed in the Deferred Prosecution Agreement 
(United_States_District_Court, 2010) indicate that the organizational costs for reha-
bilitation from the scandal are considerably lower compared to Siemens or Daim-
ler. 
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b) Social sanctioning – prominence/timing of transgression: On September 29, 2010, the 
SEC “charged ABB Ltd with violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) 
for using subsidiaries to pay bribes to Mexican officials to obtain business with gov-
ernment-owned power companies, and to pay kickbacks to Iraq to obtain contracts un-
der the U.N. Oil for Food Program“ (SEC, 2010a). The agreed DPA lasting for three 
years from September 2010 on was hence initiated almost two years after the agree-
ment at Siemens; moreover, the scope of the corrupt practices was limited to few sin-
gle countries only. We therefore assess the prominence of the scandal as low. Our 
assessment may be supported by the fact that the media coverage on compliance risks 
was constantly at a very low level, especially when compared to Siemens (see also 
Table 2): between 2006 and 2013, we found only 10 entries on corruption related 
reputation risk in the RepRisk database for ABB, compared to 138 for Siemens and 40 
for Daimler (RepRisk_AG, 2013). 
c) Prominence/resources of transgressor: With operations in around 100 countries em-
ploying around 146,000 employees and generating annual turnovers of around 40 bil-
lion USD (ABB, 2013a), ABB reaches only around half the dimensions of Siemens 
and Daimler and can therefore be classified for the purpose of our study as an MNC 
with a rather medium level of prominence/resources. 
Step 2: Analyzing the corruption controls before, during and after the corruption scandals 
To analyze the development of corruption controls in relation to the disclosure of corruption 
scandals, it appears simplest to distinguish between three periods: before, during and after the 
(main wave of) corruption scandals. We identified the big investigation by German officials at 
the Siemens headquarters in November 2006 as the beginning of this wave of corruption 
scandals and the settlements between the US SEC and our three case firms (Siemens in 2008, 
ABB and Daimler in 2010) as the end of this period. The period thereafter then covers the 
time from the signing of these settlements until (and slightly beyond) the date of fulfillment of 
the terms of these agreements – most notably the end of SEC monitorship and/or deferred 
prosecution agreement (DPA) in late 2012 and early 2013. The time before the main scandal 
disclosures finally goes back to and slightly beyond a first (minor) settlement between the US 
SEC and ABB in 2004. Our analysis is therefore structured along the following three periods: 
before (t1: 2003-2005); during (t2: 2006-2010); after (t3: 2011-2013). 
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SIEMENS: 
In the period before the scandal t1, Siemens had already installed plenty of bureaucratic con-
trols that mainly consisted of a vast set of formal rules, codes and policies to fight corruption. 
Moreover, the company partly embedded interactive corruption controls by participating in 
several voluntary initiatives like the UNGC and TI, whereof the latter organization terminated 
Siemens’ membership in 2005, arguably because the company did not decisively followed-up 
internal cases of corruption. Apart from these two elements, other types of corruption controls 
were mainly missing or at a very fractional state. 
In t2, the time during the disclosure and settlement of the corruption scandal, Siemens displays 
a sudden and unprecedented increase in corruption controls across all elements of our assess-
ment model. As regards leadership, Siemens hired Peter Löscher as a new CEO who was re-
sponsible for managing the scandal. The first externally promoted CEO in SIEMENS history 
outlines that “[w]ithin months of my taking over, we replaced about 80% of the top level of 
executives, 70% of the next level down, and 40% of the level below that. I fundamentally 
changed how our managing board made decisions. We also worked to streamline and simplify 
our global operating units” (Loescher, 2012, p. 40). Overall, the compliance staff at 
SIEMENS increased from around 60 (including part-time) to around 600 (fulltime) employ-
ees. Moreover, Löscher’s statement “only clean business is Siemens business – everywhere, 
everybody, every time” (Moosmayer and Winter, 2011, p. 4) was unprecedentedly clear. This 
strong position from leadership was complemented by comprehensive training programs and 
whistle-blowing procedures. Besides these socially/culturally transmitted corruption controls, 
SIEMENS implemented a comprehensive set of administrative controls. These controls in-
cluded a strictly centralized structure of value flows and approval processes, a bonus/malus 
system to align incentives and specialized audits by the compliance departments in addition to 
the general tasks performed by the audit department (for further analyses, see also Gebhardt 
and Müller-Seitz, 2011; Graeff, Schroeder and Wolf, 2009). 
In addition, Siemens launched unprecedented initiatives related to the interactive corruption 
controls assessment dimension. Most notably, Siemens launched the ‘Collective Action’ ini-
tiative in 2008 and actively promoted its new program in its institutional environment, e.g. at 
international industry and governmental meetings but also through collaborations with aca-
demia. The Collective Action program partly emerged in the context of the 2009 agreement 
with the World Bank wherein “Siemens has also agreed to co-operate to change industry prac-
tices, clean up procurement practices and engage in collective action with the World Bank 
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Group to fight fraud and corruption.“ (World_Bank, 2009, p. 1). In direct relation to this 
agreement “Siemens launched the global Siemens Integrity Initiative with a budget of 
US$100 million. It promotes organizations and projects that fight corruption and fraud 
through collective action, education and training. In the first round, we selected 31 organiza-
tions and projects and we support them with a total of US$37.7 million.” (Siemens, 2013b, p. 
17). Beyond these financial contributions to public institutions, the following are references to 
activities that go well beyond the terms of the World Bank agreement: 
“The available methods range from integrity pacts for individual procurement transac-
tions right through to industry-specific codes of conduct and compliance pacts“ (web-
site section on sustainability1) 
 “… we plan to focus our collective action activities in fiscal 2013 on our particular 
business requirements more intensively than in the past. There are many ways to do 
this. For example, future CRAs can increase the emphasis on defining collective action 
measures such as fair competition partnerships between bidders for large contracts or 
the voluntary self-commitment of industry federations to compliance standards that 
reduce compliance-related risks.” (Siemens, 2013a, p. 30) 
It is to note that Siemens takes a strong proactive rather than (passive) participative approach 
in these collective action activities, see for example the title of the company’s program com-
munication: “How we can drive Collective Action“ (Meyer and Waldschmidt, 2012, p. 22). 
Comparing the perspectives from our interview partners in the (divisional) HQ region in 
Germany and Switzerland with the subsidiary in Australia, the management of collective ac-
tion at Siemens appears to be directed mainly through the HQ. In contrast, the common per-
ception of interviewees in the Australian subsidiary was that the highly regulated national 
institutional environment makes active corporate intents to shape the fight against corruption 
redundant.  
As regards t3, the time after the disclosure and settlements, Siemens main concern is to in-
crease the efficiency of the very comprehensive and radically implemented compliance sys-
tem. What has been stated as a goal in our first interview round in late 2012, was then largely 
realized at the time of our second interview in late 2013, e.g. controls have been reduced for 
location where no incidents were detected over the last years of repeated assessment, thresh-
olds for approval process have been eased. Furthermore, compliance personnel was slightly 
reduced, while we cannot yet fully interpret the decision to abandon the compliance mandate 
in the executive board, executed by Peter Solmssen, in November 2013. 
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DAIMLER: 
Like at Siemens, corruption controls at Daimler in the period before the scandal (t1) were for a 
long time mainly restricted to bureaucratic controls comprised of formalized rules and poli-
cies as well as interactive controls through participation in voluntary initiatives like the 
UNGC. However, earlier than Siemens and already before they were hit by the scandal, 
Daimler introduced further – at least basic – measures to derive at a more balanced set of cor-
ruption controls in 2005, as illustrated in Table 3. Most notably, our document analysis re-
vealed that the dimension of socially/culturally transmitted corruption controls was fostered 
since that year by adding a leadership statement, training activities and a corruption-specific 
whistle-blowing procedure. Furthermore, we found evidence in the analyzed documents that 
Daimler increased its administrative corruption controls in 2005 by monitoring and following-
up on cases of corruption (see Table 3: full coverage of GRI indicators SO2, SO3 and SO4 
since 2005). 
Before we address the implementation of corruption controls in t2, during the scandal, it 
makes more sense to look at the corruption controls after the scandal (t3) first, because we had 
difficulties to explain the final state of Daimler’s corruption controls at t3 simply based on the 
initial characteristics of the company’s scandal. Despite the slightly lower regulatory sanc-
tions and the significantly lower social sanctions as compared to Siemens, Daimler’s compli-
ance program consisted of a very comprehensive and well-balanced set of corruption controls 
that in many aspects comes close to the one at Siemens. As depicted in Table 2, Daimler’s 
compliance program contained strong socially/culturally transmitted controls comprised of 
clear signals from and to leadership against a ‘self-servicing’ mentality, a separate compliance 
mandate in the managing board, comprehensive training activities and a functioning whistle-
blowing procedure. This dimension is well complemented by an administrative one, most 
notably strong evidence of risk assessments, monitoring and sanctioning (dismissals). Further 
more, third party accounts, regularly used for bribery payments in the past, were significantly 
reduced, although the level of value flow centralization at the company HQ does not fully 
reach the one at Siemens. After a pioneering round of personal interviews and documentary 
analysis, we were not fully satisfied, because we were not able to sufficiently explain the suf-
ficient overlaps in Siemens’ and Daimler’s compliance programs despite significant variation 
especially as regards the levels of social sanctioning. 
The dissatisfaction led us to place particular focus on factors that may have influenced the 
reintegration process after the disclosure of the scandal. We consulted the literature on con-
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tingencies before conducting further empirical research. From the literature, press coverage 
and personal interviews with an experienced lawyer at Gibson Dunn, we understood that in 
the case of a deferred FCPA prosecution agreement (DPA), an externally imposed FCPA 
monitor is able to get insights into the company that significantly go beyond regular audits. 
Together with its team, the monitor can request access to all sorts of compliance related 
documents, interview a random selection of people across various hierarchical positions and 
visit an unrestricted number of foreign subsidiaries (Hartmann, 2012; Schwarz, 2011).  
Our analysis then revealed that corruption controls in t2 have been implemented rather slowly 
and insufficiently, as made evident for example in the press coverage about the strictly secret 
“First Follow-up Monitor Report” by the SEC installed external monitor, Louis Freeh, (see 
Spiegel_Online, 2011). Based on the coverage about this first monitor report we can state that 
several of the strong social/cultural and administrative elements included in Daimler’s com-
pliance program in (late) t3 – most notably strong leadership signals to act upon the apparent 
self-servicing mentality of top managers, comprehensive risk assessments and sanctions – 
were only implemented in the context of this critique by the monitor implying not only the 
thread of additional (regulatory) fines, but also in this case considerable social atten-
tion/sanctioning through the media. Only in another follow-up report in 2012, the same per-
son stated that “Daimler AG's management has in many respects done more than required in a 
settlement with U.S. institutions“ and "Daimler really wants to become world champion in 
compliance" (see Dow_Jones_Newswires, 2012). These final judgments of the SEC monitor 
may hold as another indicator that Daimler’s compliance program finally reached a very com-
prehensive and balance level that entails voluntary elements and the intent to promote leading 
practices. 
To sum up, in contrast to Siemens, Daimler’s comprehensive compliance program did not 
mainly evolve directly and promptly as a result of the disclosure of the company’s corrupt 
practices, but to a considerable extent at a later time of the reintegration process due to con-
tinuous pressure exercised by the SEC external monitor. The impact of this monitorship on 
Daimler’s anti-corruption strategies is illustrated in Figure 2. 
ABB: 
Our analysis of ABB’s corruption controls took yet a very different course of ‘sense making’ 
as compared to the two other cases. A main reason for that was the almost exclusive focus of 
our ABB interview partners on ABB’s present state (t3) of corruption controls. Apart from 
that, our interview partners put a strict focus on the social/cultural dimension of controls, 
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which also corresponds with ABB’s written communication as evident in the title of the com-
pany’s anti-corruption activities constantly referring to integrity instead of compliance. 
To begin with this period t3 addressed almost exclusively by our interview partners at ABB, 
we indeed assessed strong and comprehensive elements of social/culturally transmitted con-
trols for this period: most notably, the existence of a global and in-depth case study approach 
to training build on real (anonymized) incidents from the past, a sound and offensively com-
municated whistle-blowing procedure (including a little information desk in the HQ lobby) 
and strong leadership support (including clear anti-corruption statements and representation in 
the board). However, apart from these strong socially/culturally transmitted controls and the 
participation in certain interactive controls (memberships in the Partnering Against Corrup-
tion Initiative (PACI) of the World Economic Forum, TI and the UNGC) our interview part-
ners were very reluctant to provide us with detailed information on administratively transmit-
ted controls. Indeed, we can reasonably assume that ABB has installed thee controls at least at 
a basic level considering, among other things, that the company managed to successfully ter-
minate its DPA. However, repeated further inquiries from our side without tangible responses 
and a convincing judgment from a third party lead us to conclude that the scope of ABB’s 
administrative controls somewhat falls behind the scope of its socially/culturally transmitted 
controls. A gap between the perception of ABB and our/external observations is most evident 
in the processes of risk assessment, monitoring and follow-up/sanctioning. To give an exam-
ple, we understood that ABB mainly relies on annual surveys and the audit department to 
conduct corruption risk assessments. However, we know from SIEMENS, that comprehensive 
anti-corruption assessment teams from the compliance group conduct these corruption risk 
assessments complementary to the general investigations by the audit department. Further-
more, ABB’s reporting on sanctions and follow-ups is far less comprehensive than the one at 
SIEMENS. 
As regards the period of disclosure and settlement t2, we should recall first that ABB faced a) 
lower regulatory sanctions (in particular as regards the absence of an external monitor) and b) 
almost negligible social sanctions (see Table 2) compared to Siemens. While respondents of 
all three analyzed firms mentioned the powerful role of the US SEC, only our interview part-
ners at ABB denied that their anti-corruption strategy was considerably impacted by the 2008 
to 2010 wave of scandal disclosures and settlements. They admitted that there was indeed a 
whole list of organizational requirements the company had to fulfill in order to comply with 
the FCPA, but from the rhetoric of our respondents, it became apparent that they were confi-
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dent that no huge changes need to be implemented in order to fully comply with the act and 
that a systemic culture of organizational corruption has never existed at ABB. 
Only in a second round of documentary analysis and interviews we could further uncover the 
reasons why ABB may have already installed a considerable amount of corruption controls in 
t1. A key driver may have been indeed an earlier settlement between ABB and the SEC in 
2004. The comparatively very small dimensions of this settlement (bribes of 1.1 million USD 
and a penalty of 10.5 million USD) and the early date may explain why we did not initially 
notice this settlement. Nevertheless, our analysis revealed that this time was just the begin-
ning of the then rapidly evolving wave of enforcements by the SEC (GibsonDunn, 2013) put-
ting ABB in the role of a first mover. Table 2 illustrates that ABB has indeed been the first 
company (at least as regards our three case firms) to install certain corruption controls, espe-
cially socially/culturally transmitted ones, in this period t1. Not only the overall scope devoted 
for reporting on anti-corruption, but in particular a clear zero-tolerance statement, information 
on training, the installation of a whistle-blowing procedure and the membership in several 
voluntary initiatives (PACI, TI, UNGC) are examples for leading innovative practices at ABB 
that at this time had not yet been addressed at Daimler and Siemens. 
Step 3: Deducing the legitimation strategies from the combination of corruption controls 
SIEMENS: 
As outlined in step 2 of our analysis, the Siemens corruption controls were restricted to a 
combination of a set of formal rules and policies and rather passive participatory commitment 
in voluntary interactive initiatives like the UNGC or initially TI. Given that these activities 
lacked any considerable aspects of the other corruption control types (leadership support, 
training, complaints procedure, monitoring, follow-up), Siemens’ anti-corruption activities in 
t1 can be clearly associated with (and are mainly restricted to) a legitimacy strategy of ‘decou-
pling’ or symbolic manipulation. 
With the radical implementation of all types of corruption controls each of unprecedented 
scope, this strategy of ceremonial influence via ‘decoupling’ in t1 then shifted directly to the 
other extreme: a strategy of ‘substantial influence/manipulation’ via ‘over-fulfillment’. 
Moreover, we argue that even the creation and (at least initial) implementation of the 
SIEMENS ‘collective action’ program is part of the ‘substantial influence strategy’ rather 
than a ‘moral reasoning’ strategy as the name might indicate. The language used in the report-
ing outlined above (e.g. “we selected”, “our aim is”, “we plan to focus”, …) and at public 
presentations ("how we can drive", "aproach public sector customers/competitors", Meyer and 
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Waldschmidt, 2012) suggests that the company can determine rather independently where and 
how its integrity pact and compliance pacts are to be imposed on business partners.!
Only after these new processes had been installed to a considerable extent, SIEMENS more 
and more included elements of a ‘moral reasoning’ strategy to identify – through round tables, 
meetings etc. – how the immense process can be streamlined and made more efficient and 
whether certain practices can be abandoned again (reduction in staff and leadership, increase 
of thresholds, less assessments, …) in t3. 
It is to add however, that such an approach requires a certain level of transgressor power. 
SIEMENS’ strong market position with little competition in many of its business divisions 
(e.g. healthcare, wind power, electrical engineering and electronics), may have forced Sie-
mens directly to implement a 180° strategic change leading the company to the proactive role 
of an ‘institutional entrepreneur’ in the fight against corruption. Siemens’ strong market 
power and intent to be a sustainability pioneer is illustrated in the following quote by the 
member of the Siemens Sustainability Advisory Board Björn Stigson: “It is pioneers like 
Siemens – with its technological expertise, innovative strength and implementation skills – 
that make a big contribution to the sustainable development of our planet“ (Siemens, 2013b, 
p. 12). 
DAIMLER: 
In contrast to Siemens, Daimler applies a rather mixed set of legitmation strategies. In t1, 
Daimler also participates in several voluntary initiatives, pointing towards elements of a 
‘moral reasoning’ strategy. However, as outline in step 2 of our analysis, Daimler had already 
implemented several other sorts of compliance controls. Further considering that several of 
these controls existed already elsewhere (for example at ABB), we may have elements of an 
‘isomorphic adaption’ strategy here. Given the scope of the later disclosed scandals revealing 
systemic corrupt practices continuing well into this period, ‘decoupling’ was obviously a key 
strategy at t1. 
At t2, our analysis suggests that initially after the disclosure of the scandal, Daimler focused 
on slowly adapting to the regulatory pressures the company was facing: ‘isomorphic adop-
tion’ strategy. More precisely, this strategy may be associated with the concept of “coercive 
isomorphism” in the institutional theory literature (e.g. DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  
As regards t3, the fact that DAIMLER plays a more active role in the UNGC since the founda-
tion of the UN Global Compact LEAD initiative may constitute also an example pointing to a 
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clear ‘moral reasoning’ strategy. Even more interestingly, after the critical feedback from the 
external monitor and additional negative media attention/social sanctioning during the reinte-
gration process, the final statements of the compliance monitor pointed toward the willingness 
of DAIMLER to go beyond regulatory requirements and apply worldwide leading anti-
corruption processes. While most elements of DAIMLER’s compliance strategy seem to be 
present in leading compliance programs already, the fact that DAIMLER chose to prolong the 
board mandate for legal and integrity even after termination of the regulatory proceedings, 
occupied by Dr. Hohmann-Dennhardt, may constitute a first example where DAIMLER’s 
program surpasses the one at SIEMENS that chose to abandon a separate board position for 
legal and integrity in late 2013. Possible elements of a ‘strategic influence’ strategy may 
therefore be present at Daimler in t3 as well, marked with a dashed line and question marks in 
Figure 2. 
ABB: 
ABB as well applies a mixed set of legitimation strategies in all of the three periods. In t1, 
considering that ABB was the first company (at least of our three case firms) to install a set of 
social/cultural controls and the company participating in most voluntary anti-corruption initia-
tives points towards the strategies of ‘moral reasoning’ and ‘strategic influence’. However, 
ABB’s strategic influence remains rather ambiguous given that we did not find evidence for a 
proactive promotion aimed at the diffusion of ABB’s newly installed social/cultural controls. 
Nonetheless, some of ABB’s practices (training, whistle-blowing) became com-
mon/institutionalized practices in the following years. ABB’s ambiguous ‘substantial influ-
ence’ strategy is hence marked with a dashed frame in Figure 2. Finally, considering that 
ABB’s integrity program was found to have several deficits as identified in the 2010 settle-
ment with the SEC, ‘decoupling’ was also part of ABB’s strategy portfolio. 
In t2, beside the continuous focus on its social/cultural controls (‘moral reasoning’ and ele-
ments of ‘institutional entrepreneurship’ strategies), the ‘isomorphic adoption’ strategy be-
came dominant at ABB given that the company, in contrast to its 2004 settlement, now had a 
comprehensive list of compliance program requirements to fulfill. Finally, the voluntary and 
comprehensive collaboration of ABB leads us to conclude that ‘decoupling’ was no longer 
apparent. 
Only for t3, we can not exclude with certainty, that elements of ‘decoupling’ reoccurred given 
the gap in perception between ABB and external observers regarding the comprehensives of 
ABB’s administrative controls. We thus include this strategy with a fragmented frame and 
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question marks in Figure 2 to acknowledge a considerable uncertainty regarding the possible 
presence of this strategy. 
-------------------------------!
Insert Figure 2 about here 
-------------------------------!
FINDINGS 
We should first note that all three case firms successfully terminated their monitoring and/or 
‘deferred prosecution agreement’ (DPA) period and we could not find indications for any 
‘new’ systemic corruption cases during our interviews and media analysis. However, despite 
the fact that all three transgressors managed to finally regain legitimacy and implemented a 
list of similar compliance program requirements, considerable – and partially surprising – 
differences exist in the strategies to regaining legitimacy as well as in the scope and balance 
of the ‘final’ compliance programs. In fact, the findings derived from our three cases may 
provide a valuable contribution to the institutional theory perspective on corruption by outlin-
ing under which conditions an institutional entrepreneur may arise, when gradual organiza-
tional reintegration models are most coherently followed, and when elements of a paradox 
approach may remain. 
Radical change and ‘over-fulfillment’ rather than gradual reintegration in case of an 
unprecedented social and regulatory legitimacy shock 
Contrary to previous research suggesting that companies facing an unprecedented corruption 
or fraud scandal like Enron, WorldCom or Tyco may not recover due to the immense stigma 
“first movers“ confront (Goffman, 2009; Pfarrer et al., 2008), our study reveals a promising 
strategy how “first movers” may indeed successfully be able to recover. Responding to both 
research questions, our analysis indicates that in the case of an unprecedented scandal as re-
gards to both regulatory and social sanctioning, the most promising chance of the transgressor 
(first-mover) is to radically and abruptly apply substantial actions to change its anti-corruption 
processes and strategy, instead of following a prototype step-by-step reintegration approach 
which might be more applicable under less extreme circumstances (see Pfarrer et al., 2008). 
SIEMENS constitutes an exemplary case of such a radical approach. As outlined in our analy-
sis, SIEMENS faced not only an unprecedented level of regulatory but also social sanctions. 
In particular, the event at Wittelsbacher Platz on November 15, 2006 when close to 200 police 
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men and officials gathered in front of the SIEMENS Munich headquarter to confiscate all 
sorts of material relevant to investigate the SIEMENS corruption cases, generated such an 
instant and immense legitimacy shock that then also immediately triggered the conviction at 
SIEMENS that the only chance to recover is to respond radically, substantially and proac-
tively. Peter Löscher, the new CEO hired as a result of the disclosed corruption scandal, con-
tinuously reminds his audience to “never miss the opportunities that come from a good crisis” 
(Loescher, 2012, p. 40), and he adds that they certainly did not miss theirs.  
As to our second research question, Siemens managed to achieve a 180 degree turnaround in 
its compliance strategy – from an organizational structure of widespread corruption and fa-
çade building to the role of an ‘institutional entrepreneur’ (see Misangyi et al., 2008) promot-
ing compliance in its environment. As our analysis of compliance processes based on aca-
demic and practitioner assessment models revealed, Siemens implemented the whole range of 
compliance processes in an excessive manner. In this case, unprecedented regulatory and so-
cial sanctioning led to the comprehensive implementation of all regulatory and socially 
transmitted corruption controls (see Lange, 2008) plus the inclusion of strong interactive ele-
ments affecting the organizational environment as identified as a key pillar for organizational 
citizenship (Baumann-Pauly and Scherer, 2013), or here also: institutional entrepreneurship. 
This quick and decisive change is modeled by the clear shift from symbolic to substantial ma-
nipulation, i.e. from decoupling (t1) to substantial influence (t2), in the Siemens process analy-
sis of Figure 2. 
Considering this radical shift from one extreme of a ‘manipulation’ strategy to the other in 
order to regain legitimacy, we argue that the distinction between symbolic manipulation via 
‘decoupling’ and substantial manipulation, i.e. ‘strategic influence’ or over-fulfillment, has 
not been comprehensively covered in the existing legitimacy literature (see e.g. Oliver, 1991; 
Scherer et al., 2013). Especially in a context of changing and heterogeneous institutional envi-
ronments and the presence of certain forms of legitimacy shocks, it appears important to ana-
lyze these two extreme forms of manipulation separately (see also Gebhardt and Müller-Seitz, 
2011). Such a separate consideration may then also enrich anti-corruption reintegration mod-
els (e.g. Pfarrer et al., 2008) and provide important links between the literature on institutional 
determinism (e.g. DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) and the literature on institutional entrepre-
neurship (e.g. Battilana et al., 2009). Our findings therefore underline the necessity depicted 
in our conceptual model (see Figure 1) to separate – at least in a scandal or crisis context – 
these two forms of manipulation and positioning them as extreme strategies below and above 
the remaining (adaptation and reasoning) strategies. 
! !
!
!
$+!
Gradual yet comprehensive reintegration in case of strong regulatory sanctioning and 
monitoring yet less severe social sanctioning 
Our analysis indicates that academic models on reintegration and legitimation strategies (see 
Pfarrer et al., 2008; Scherer et al., 2013) appear to be particularly valid under conditions of 
less extreme yet still comprehensive cases of corruption scandals. Referring to our first re-
search question, especially in the absence of legitimacy shocks attracting huge public aware-
ness and social sanctioning, the transgressors may have the TIME of applying elements from 
different legitimacy strategies in parallel and/or sequentially and handling the corruption 
scandal in a step-by-step manner.  
DAIMLER constitutes a good example of this approach. In comparison to SIEMENS, al-
though facing a corruption scandal of similar (geographic) scope involving high levels of 
regulatory sanctions, “DAIMLER played it differently” (interview partner at the chambers of 
Gibson & Dunn). Our analysis suggests that DAIMLER generally followed a more linear and 
gradual reintegration path than SIEMENS. This path may well be in line with conceptual rein-
tegration models, see for example the four reintegration stages conceptualized by Pfarrer et al. 
(2008): discovery, explanation, penance, rehabilitation. Before radically installing all sorts of 
compliance processes, the company took a more passive approach during the discovery stage, 
i.e. until most facts have been collected and disclosed. Next, whereas SIEMENS had no time 
for internally constructing explanations before responding with strong internal penance, most 
notably the exchange of most of its top management, DAIMLER spent considerable amounts 
of time on internally finding appropriate explanations and respond with penance. Arguably as 
a result of the lacking severe social legitimacy shock, it took not only more time to create 
awareness among the DAIMLER workforce for the corruption scandal but also led to expla-
nations of the scandal originating in the educational background of its workforce and the 
common use of corruption in the institutional environment. These explanations then led to 
less extreme internal penances, e.g. as regards top management exchange, as compared to 
SIEMENS.  
Despite this significantly less radical and more passive approach to respond to its corruption 
scandal, DAIMLER reached at the end of its rehabilitation a comprehensive and mostly bal-
anced compliance program that in many aspects comes close to the one at SIEMENS. Only in 
another round of documentary analysis and interviews, we found that the presence of an ex-
ternal compliance monitor imposed by the SEC – through critical comments especially in the 
first interim report – may have strongly contributed to the final comprehensive compliance 
program. From our multiple dynamic case analysis, we can now see that the power or re-
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sources of the transgressor are rather a necessary instead of a sufficient precondition for im-
plementing compliance programs of worldwide leading standards: In the SIEMENS case, we 
found the immense social legitimacy shock to be the major trigger for substantial change; As 
pictured in Figure 2 (Siemens boxes at t2 and t3), the monitor along the reintegration process 
then only played a (minor) complimentary role for triggering these changes. In the absence of 
such a legitimacy shock, however, we perceive the strong role of the SEC imposed external 
monitor at DAIMLER indeed as a major factor for achieving strong compliance programs 
(see Figure 2: Daimler boxes at t2 and t3). 
Mixed and partially inconsistent or even paradox anti-corruption strategies in case of 
repeated minor corruption scandals 
The reintegration process at ABB is neither a typical case for anti-corruption institutional en-
trepreneurship nor gradual reintegration ‘after the fall’ (see Pfarrer et al., 2008). While con-
taining elements of these two cases, reintegration at ABB displays a mixed and sometimes 
inconsistent or even paradox picture of anti-corruption strategies and hence further enriches 
the response to our two research questions. As illustrated in the analysis of ABB over time in 
Figure 2, ABB shows the most diverse spectrum of legitimation strategies in our sample. This 
mixed approach may be partially explained by the presence of a series of two corruption 
scandal disclosures each of lower dimensions that not demanded for clear and sudden reac-
tions. However, the fact that ABB focuses its response on social controls even though the 
scandal characteristics were dominated by regulatory – as opposed to social – sanctions may 
not be explained by organizational corruption control models (e.g. Lange, 2008) and necessi-
tates the consideration of other contingencies. 
On the one extreme and related to our second research question, we indeed find elements of 
institutional entrepreneurship or over-fulfillment at ABB. These elements mainly relate to 
corruption controls of a social/cultural dimension, as opposed to an administrative one, and 
focus on ‘intrinsic orientation’ instead of ‘autonomy reduction’ or ‘consequence systems’ (see 
Lange, 2008). As outlined in our analysis, ABB initiated such socially and morally oriented 
activities already during/after its first SEC 2004 settlement. Still after ABB’s second SEC 
settlement, we perceive an almost exclusive focus of ABB on integrity based training and 
communication strategy as well as the strong promotion of its whistle-blower hotline as key 
evidence for this social/cultural oriented corruption control approach. In contrast to direct 
attempts of ‘strategic influence’ at SIEMENS, ABB tends to focus on an open value-based 
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legitimation approach; hence the ‘(moral) reasoning’ strategy seems to clearly dominate the 
‘strategic influence’ strategy. 
On the other extreme and further enriching our knowledge relating to the first research ques-
tion, we find conflicting or even paradox elements in ABB’s anti-corruption strategy that may 
at least partially relate to some sort of ‘decoupling’. First of all, the mere fact that ABB had to 
reach a second settlement with the SEC in 2010 is an indicator that the ABB integrity pro-
gram, by then, was not comprehensive but instead contained some sorts of ‘decoupled’ ele-
ments. Certain forms of ‘decoupling’ can however still be found after reintegration in the con-
text of this second settlement considering a) the clear impression we got during our interviews 
that ABB perceives itself as leading/best practice in every aspect of anti-corruption manage-
ment and b) our analysis, backed up by an industry peer and other external field experts, that 
there are indeed certain gaps between ABB’s administrative controls and the industry best 
practices. 
This ambiguity is further enhanced by the fact that ABB argues to engage in leading integrity 
activities, but is less willing to transparently communicate their activities to us. We were 
hardly able to obtain precise information especially on administrative controls and follow-ups, 
but also on the reasons for the corruption scandal and the reintegration process; furthermore, 
our key informants at the ABB headquarter repeatedly asked us not to interview other ABB 
representatives. To understand this apparent contradiction of focusing on integrity and train-
ing instead of administrative controls, despite the fact that ABB faced higher levels of regula-
tory than social sanctioning, we identified the role of an external monitor and the scope of the 
investigation team as key explanations. As outlined in the analysis, in contrast to DAIMLER 
and SIEMENS, no external monitor was imposed at ABB. Similarly, the investigations at 
ABB by other external constituencies such as lawyers, consultants or auditors were consid-
erably lower in scope as compared to the other two cases, especially SIEMENS. ABB may 
therefore not have experienced this process of “leaving no stone unturned” by external 
authorities. Consequently, rather than establishing such a system aiming to achieve full trans-
parency about every business process, ABB chose the possibly less resource intensive ap-
proach to prevent corrupt behavior by trying to reach, and if necessary change, the mindset of 
its employees. 
In between these two extremes and especially after the second SEC settlement, ABB seems to 
apply elements of an isomorphic adoption strategy. Apart from some exceptions, e.g. com-
prehensive case-based integrity training, the company may have decided to orientate more at 
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existing practices of competitors like Siemens. A mere comparison of the slogans of each 
company’s compliance program (Siemens: “Prevent, Detect, Respond” and ABB “Prevent, 
Detect, Resolve”) may support our impression. Another example was found during our docu-
ment analysis: Siemens’ slogan “Only clean business is Siemens business – everywhere, eve-
rybody – every time” (see Moosmayer and Winter, 2011, p. 4) can be found expressed in a 
very similar way in the ABB Code of Conduct: “We expect this [acting ethically and with 
integrity] of every single ABB employee, in every location, every day” (ABB, 2013b, p. 4). 
We can therefore conclude from these findings that a) a scandal needs a certain level of shock 
or urgency, even if it places the transgressor in the role of a first-mover, to trigger a holistic 
set of innovative and comprehensive anti-corruption processes, and b) even after a series of 
minor scandals, the transgressor may still try to simultaneously accommodate passive and 
proactive strategies in the fight against corruption. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This dynamic case study is designed to uncover the impact of corruption scandals on trigger-
ing organizational change processes over time to regain legitimacy. Our findings offer in-
sights into global institutionalization processes of anti-corruption processes and contribute to 
the development of theory on anti-corruption and institutional entrepreneurship in three ways: 
First, we identify and explain the central role of a strong legitimacy shock in a changing and 
complex anti-corruption institutional environment. Second, this study highlights the important 
role of continuous external monitoring in cases where corruption scandals lack such a strong 
legitimacy shock. Third, corruption scandals without greater legitimacy shocks and an ab-
sence of external monitoring may trigger innovative anti-corruption practices as well,  
Regarding the first contribution, our findings extend the theoretical knowledge modeled by 
Pfarrer et al. (Pfarrer et al., 2008), by proposing that in the presence of a strong legitimacy 
shock related to the disclosure of a big corruption scandal, the transgressor (here: Siemens) 
may no longer be able to reintegrate into an existing group of ‘legitimate’ MNCs. Instead, the 
transgressor may have no other choice but to radically expand its anti-corruption processes 
and focus on only one strategy, here ‘strategic influence’ aimed at raising the standards in its 
institutional environment, rather than applying different strategies at the same time to manage 
complex expectations in the environment (Scherer et al., 2013).  
As to the second contribution, in the presence of a big scandal without a strong shock of le-
gitimacy, however, the transgressor (here: Daimler) may have some time to develop its cor-
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ruption controls. The lack of a severe legitimacy shock may result in reduced internal and 
external ‘attention’ making additional external pressure necessary to develop comprehensive 
controls and take a more proactive role in the fight against corruption. More precisely, we 
identify and specify the important role of an externally appointed monitor continuously over-
looking the reintegration process from inside the target company. While previous literature 
mainly pointed to the role of industry competition and resources to determine the reintegra-
tion or legitimation strategy, looking particularly at the case of Daimler and its rugged itera-
tive progression in regaining legitimacy, we found that these mediators are at best compli-
mentary to the presence of a stringent monitoring in finding the company’s final reintegration 
strategy.  
Finally, regarding our third contribution, previous arguments on a mix of multiple legitimacy 
strategies to handle complex expectations in an organization’s environment (Scherer et al., 
2013) seem to be supported by our study in cases where a corruption scandal fails to surpass 
certain thresholds and trigger legitimacy shocks. While such minor scandals may nonetheless 
put a corporation in the role of a first-mover (here: ABB especially at t1) generating innova-
tive organizational processes attributable to a corporation’s role as institutional entrepreneur, 
these elements of a ‘strategic influence’ strategy exist parallel to a mixed and sometimes con-
tradictory set of other legitimacy strategies. At ABB, the absence of external monitoring 
might also explain why the company has implemented stronger anticorruption processes on 
the integrity, i.e. socially transmitted, side than on the compliance, i.e. administratively 
transmitted, side – despite the fact that ABB faced higher administrative/regulatory pressure 
than social pressure upon disclosure of the transgressions. These arguments may thus also 
provide valuable insights to further develop corruption control models (see e.g. Lange, 2008). 
To conclude, our comparative qualitative analysis proposes several specifications and expla-
nations of reintegration processes models after a corruption scandal (Pfarrer et al., 2008) and 
interaction processes between the transgressor and its institutional environment (Gebhardt and 
Müller-Seitz, 2011). We argue that only the combination of a big scandal involving a strong 
legitimacy shock may trigger radical changes in a firm’s anti-corruption strategy that appears 
necessary to exercise a substantial influence on the anti-corruption standards in its institu-
tional field. Hence only Siemens fully classifies as an institutional entrepreneur in our analy-
sis. The immense public attention also affected deeply the souls of ‘every’ Siemens employee 
making a cultural organizational change inevitable. In addition, however, the unprecedented 
legal investigations and screenings created an unprecedented level of transparency, enabling 
or even forcing Siemens to break the taboo of not communicating about corruption. 
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Ultimately, we are confident that the results of the research project are also of relevance for 
both practitioners and academic scholars interested in more general institutional designs such 
as general CSR initiatives or standards. As this study was designed as a follow-up study on 
corporate social responsibility implementation in the UN Global Compact (UNGC), we pro-
vided clear evidence that – at least under less extreme scandal characteristics and power con-
stellations (Daimler as opposed to Siemens) – a stringent and continuous externally imposed 
monitoring of UNGC participants may be very fruitful for achieving the aspired learning pro-
gresses that so far appear fractional at best (see Schembera, 2012). While the UNGC so far 
argues that it simply lacks the resources to install direct monitorships, one pragmatic solution 
would be to establish a fund collecting the resources for appointing monitor teams to UNGC 
participants. UNGC members as well as representatives from politics may have interests in 
contributing financially to the fund to maintain and enhance the credibility of the initiative.
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Figure 1: Theoretical Framework –  
Institutional expectations, scandal characteristics and legitimation strategies 
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Figure 2: Analysis of the interplay between corruption scandals and legitimation strate-
gies over time 
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Table 1: Synthesis of Corruption Control Elements 
Dimension Elements Key elements from original sources 
Social/cultural 
corruption con-
trols 
Leadership support (e.g. CEO 
statement) 
• SC guidelines: oversight by high-level 
personnel  
• CC tool (dimension I): Strategic integra-
tion and leadership support 
 Training 
(e.g. communication, awareness 
building, seminars, case studies)  
• SC guidelines: effective communication 
• CC tool: Training 
• See also OCC circumplex: Type 7: Self-
controls 
 Whistle-blowing procedure 
(e.g. anonymous complaint hot-
line) 
• OCC circumplex: Type 6: Vigilance 
controls; Type 8: Concertive controls 
(horizontal surveillance by coworkers) 
• CC tool (dimension II): Creation of a 
complaint procedure 
Administrative 
corruption con-
trols 
 
Bureaucratic controls  
(e.g. formalized rules, policies, 
hierarchical and centralized 
structure, specialization of jobs) 
• OCC circumplex: Type 1: Bureaucratic 
controls 
• SC guidelines: compliance standards and 
procedures; due care in delegating sub-
stantial discretionary authority 
 Incentive alignments  
(e.g. via compensation plans) 
• OCC circumplex: Type 3: Incentive 
alignments 
• CC tool (dimension II): Alignment of 
incentive structures 
 Monitoring and follow-up 
(e.g. risk assessment, audits, 
sanctions) 
• SC guidelines: Monitoring, auditing, re-
porting; enforcement and disciplinary 
mechanisms; response upon detection 
• OCC circumplex: Type 2: Punishment 
(measuring, monitoring and sanctioning) 
• CC tool (dimension II): Evaluation 
Interactive cor-
ruption controls 
 
Collective Action  
(e.g. integrity pacts, stakeholder 
dialogue, participation in volun-
tary anti-corruption initiatives) 
• CC tool (dimension III): Quality of 
stakeholder relationships; level of partici-
pation in collaborative CC initiatives 
• Beyond requirements of Lange (2008) and 
Sentencing Guidelines 
!
Legend: 
• CC = Corporate Citizenship 
• OCC = Organizational Corruption Control 
• SC = Sentencing Commission 
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Table 2: Overview of analyzed data per source (as of January 2014) 
 Siemens Daimler ABB Third parties (lawyers, 
auditors, NGOs, officials) 
Academia 
Interviews D/CH 2 2 2 4 ca. 10 
Interviews AUS 2 1 1 3 ca. 5 
FCPA related 
documents 
6 6 6 3 - 
Company reports & 
policies 
12 9 13 - - 
Media (RepRisk, as 
of Sep. 04, 2013) 
138 40 10 - - 
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Table 3: Analysis of corruption controls before, during and after the corruption scan-
dals 
Dimension Criteria Before (t1: 2003-
2005) 
• 1st ABB SEC set-
tlement (2004) 
During (t2: 2006-2010) 
• 2006: Investigation at 
Siemens HQ 
• SEC settlements: Sie-
mens (2008), Daimler 
and 2nd ABB (2010) 
• Siemens worldbank set-
tlement (2009) 
After (t3: 2011-2013) 
• Termination of 
DPAs/monitorships 
in 2012/13 
SIEMENS 
Leadership 
support 
 • Strongest anti-corruption 
statement by CEO Peter 
Löscher 
• Separate board position 
• Board position aban-
donned after end of 
monitorship 
Training  • SO3 fully covered  
Social/ cul-
tural corrup-
tion controls 
Whistle-
blowing 
procedure 
 • Most details on complaint 
procedure 
 
Bureaucratic 
controls 
• Several policies and 
rules 
• Strongest centralized 
structure and approval 
processes 
• Most compliance staff 
• Slight easing of ap-
proval proc-
esses/threshholds 
Incentive 
alignments 
 • Bonus/malus system • Yellow-cards 
Administra-
tive corrup-
tion controls 
 
Monitoring 
and follow-
up 
 • Additional audits by com-
pliance department, SO2 
& SO4 fully covered 
 
Interactive 
corruption 
controls 
Collective 
Action  
• Participation 
• TI membership ter-
minated (2005) 
• Own integrity initiative 
• TI membership renewed 
• SO5 fully covered 
DAIMLER 
Leadership 
support 
• Leadership state-
ment (2005)  
• Separate board position • Clear signals 
against self-
servicing 
Training • First to partially 
cover SO3 (2005) 
• SO3 fully covered  
Social/ cul-
tural corrup-
tion controls 
Whistle-
blowing 
procedure 
• Explicit reference to 
anti-corruption pro-
cedure (2005) 
  
Administra-
tive corrup-
Bureaucratic 
controls 
• Several policies and 
rules 
• Third party accounts sig-
nificantly reduced 
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Incentive 
alignments 
   tion controls 
 
Monitoring 
and follow-
up 
• First to partially 
cover SO2 and SO4 
(2005) 
• SO4 fully covered • Strong assessments 
and series of sanc-
tioning 
Interactive 
corruption 
controls 
Collective 
Action 
• Participation • SO5 fully covered • SO5 fully covered 
• UNGC Lead 
ABB 
Leadership 
support 
• First to include zero-
tolerance statement 
• Separate board position • Board position main-
tained after end of 
DPA 
Training • SO3 partially cov-
ered 
• SO3 fully covered • Case-study approach 
Social/ cul-
tural corrup-
tion controls 
Whistle-
blowing 
procedure 
• First to report on 
general complaint 
procedure 
• Prominent communication 
of hotline 
 
Bureaucratic 
controls 
• Several policies and 
rules 
 • Lowest level of de-
tails during interviews 
Incentive 
alignments 
   
Administra-
tive corrup-
tion controls 
 
Monitoring 
and follow-
up 
 • SO4 partially covered 
(2006) 
 
• Lowest level of de-
tails during interviews 
Interactive 
corruption 
controls 
Collective 
Action  
• Participation (first to 
join PACI) 
• Most voluntary member-
ships 
 
Legend: 
• DPA = Deferred Prosecution Agreement; monitorship = external monitor imposed by SEC 
• Bullets: information mainly retrieved from document analysis (not comprehensive: most signifi-
cant aspects listed only) 
• Shading: Comprehensiveness of criteria coverage ranging from non/fractional (white) to very 
strong (dark grey). Assessment also incorporates focus and details obtained through interviews; 
this remains partially subjective, due to constraints in scope of investigation. 
• SO2-SO5 (Global Reporting Initiative indicators): SO2 (Percentage and total number of business 
units analyzed for risks related to corruption); SO3 (Percentage of employees trained in organiza-
tion’s anti-corruption policies and procedures); SO4 (Actions taken in response to incidents of cor-
ruption) 
• PACI = Partnering Against Corruption Initiative; TI = Transparency International 
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